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FROM NATIONAL POPULISM TO NATIONAL CORPORATISM:
THE CASE OF BOLIVIA (1952-1970)

MEL VIN BURKE
University of Maine
JAMES M. MALLOY
University of Pittsburgh

n the wake of the depression of 1929 there sprung up
throughout Latin America a number of reformist political
movements which today are generally lumped under the term
National Populist Movements (Di Tella, 1965). Among the best
known of these movements were Alianza Popular Revolucionaria
Americana (APRA) in Peru, Accion Democratica (AD) in
Venezuela, and Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) in
Bolivia. These movements projected themselves as sui generis Latin
phenomena which would ~olve the problems of economic
development and social justice in Latin America in a unique
"national" way-neither socialist nor capitalist. While the programs of these movements varied somewhat (often reflecting their
different histories), there was and remains a central core of
national popUlist ideology and orientation.
Stripped to its essentials, the national populist ideology
projected two major goals: (1) to break the traditional dependence
of the local economy on the industrial centers of the United States
and Europe, e.g., antiimperialism; and (2) to destroy local
semifeudal structures, such as the latifundia, so as to liberate
human and material resources for state-sponsored development.
These two goals were embedded in a diagnosis which argued that
national problems were not the result of class exploitation but
rather the exploitation of the nation (middle classes, workers and
peasants) by the antination (the local oligarchy and the imperial
foreign interests it served). To resolve this problem, they argued, a
broad multiclass movement-as opposed to a class-based partyhad to be formed to seize power from the local oligarchy, break its
hold on the economy, and assert national economic as well as
political independence of the imperialist powers.
Although oriented toward the mobilization of workers and
peasants, these movements were mainly supported and led by
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elements of the dependent urban middle sectors (e.g., those who
lived off salaries and fees). The middle-class intellectual elites who
organized these movements saw themselves as paladins called upon
to lead their backward countries, and the culturally underdeveloped workers and peasants that inhabited them, to the
fulfillment of their respective national destinies. l They would do
so by seizing the state and utilizing it to regulate the society and
economy so as to achieve economic development and social
justice. Despite the fears these movements generated among
established interests, their programs were hardly revolutionary,
calling rather for substantial, but hardly total, reform imposed
from above. The political history of all these movements clearly
shows that the core orientation of the so-called populist elites was
reformist, elitist and statist.
In this paper we seek to analyze the experience of one Latin
American nation, Bolivia, which has been undergoing an experiment in a "populist" resolution of her socioeconomic problems
since 1952. We shall focus primarily on the decade of the 1960s,
when after eight years of tortuous veering along a number of
policy paths, a clear model of development began to emerge.
The model of development which emerged in Bolivia during the
1960s can best be termed national corporatism: a system of
political economy that attempts to achieve controlled economic
growth by fusing traditional hispanic concepts of state control
with modern corporate organizations in both the public and
private sectors. National corporatism is an authoritarian and statist
approach to development that results in an elitist and hierarchical
mode of social organization, which from the point of view of most
in the lower social orders is often repressive and at best
paternalistic. Ironically, the so-called populist approach, due to a
number of factors delineated below, evolves into a system of
political economy which is decidedly antipopular. The Bolivian
case is not unique but a manifestation of a general trend toward
authoritarian solutions to development evident in a number of
Latin American states. An analysis of the Bolivian case can shed
light on the general trend and contribute specific insights into
what to expect from other so-called popUlist regimes such as the
populist military government of neighboring Peru.
Bolivia: 1952-1964
In

1964 the MNR, which initiated the Bolivian National
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Revolution of 1952, was overthrown in a military coup backed by
large segments of the populace including workers and peasants.
The coup did not represent a counterrevolution so much as a
ratification by arms of the failure of the MNR to achieve the
revolutionary goals it had set for Bolivia.
The failure of the MNR to achieve its revolutionary goals can be
traced to a number of factors endemic to the contemporary
developmental situation and to the nature of populist coalitions
themselves. The first is a contradiction between the strategic
political goal of mobilizing the middle class, workers and peasants
by playing upon the pent-up demands of these groups for
increased standards of living, and the strategic economic goal of
rapid development. In the underdeveloped situation the economic
goal demands internal economies by restricting consumption, but
the political goal of the populists demands the mobilization of
support by meeting the consumptionist desires of the popular
masses.
Between 1952 and 1956 the MNR elite tried to meet both goals
at once and followed a dual policy of investment and consumption. During this period the Left, backed by workers' militias, was
dominant and Bolivia was headed in a populist and essentially
socialist direction. However, the dual policy sent the state mining
corporation (COMIBOL) into a tailspin, created severe balance of
payments problems, and set off wild inflation that fell most
heavily on the urban middle class, thereby turning that group
against the revolution.
These problems brought home three inescapable facts: (a) an
underdeveloped country cannot follow a course of economic
development and popular consumption at the same time; (b) any
process of restructuring for development demands that some social
groupings must pay the social costs of the new course; and (c) the
populist premise of a community of interests among the middle
class, workers and peasants flies in the face of the reality of the
underdeveloped situation. There is of necessity a conflict of
interests among such diverse groupings: fitst over the distribution
of rewards but latterly over the even more divisive issue of the
distribution of the social costs of any developmental strategy.
Facing the scarcity of the underdeveloped situation, the populist
movement that comes to power immediately confronts a dual
problem: (1) the contradiction between economic and political
goals; and (2) the conflict of interests among its support groups.
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Any consistent model of development requires that the government be in a position to restrict consumption in the name of
development and that it choose which of its own support groups
gain and which lose.
In confronting these difficult problems, the MNR found itself
with an additional problem, namely the need to secure external
financial support to supplement Bolivia's meager resources. In
Bolivia the decision was made to reject the socialist bloc as a
source of aid (at that stage there is serious question as to whether
the Soviet Union wanted or could afford to accept the burden)
and rely almost exclusively on the capitalist states. On one hand,
the decision reflected the need to bow to the realities of the
dependent nature of an underdeveloped economy; on the other, it
reflected the long-standing determination of not only the MNR
elite but other popUlist elites as well to stay firmly within the
western camp. The Bolivian case supports the view that populist
antiimperialism boils down to less a question of breaking the ties
that bind Latin America to the United States and Europe, than to
rearranging them in a way that hopefully benefits the local
dependent country (Cotler, 1970-71). In any event, once the
decision was made the previous questions of benefit and loss were
already decided.
This became clear in 1956 when in order to secure International
Monetary Fund (lMF) financing, the MNR accepted a monetary
stabilization program which reversed the previous thrust of the
revolution (Eder, 1968: 626). It did so by stopping the expansion
of the public sector, reintroducing market principles, and shifting
costs onto labor by freezing wages and withdrawing food
subsidies. When labor responded negatively, the MNR set out to
break its political power by rebuilding the military as a
counterweight to workers' militias and by turning the major
peasant organizations against the communist-inspired labor movement. During this period the Bolivian National Revolution was
going through a major change of gears brought on by internal and
external constraints. The major factors were: (a) the basic
reformist orientation of the old-guard MNR elite; (b) the
contradiction between economic and political logics in an
environment of extreme scarcity and high mobilization; (c) the
internal contradictions of the multi class populist movement itself;
(d) the price tag affixed to much needed external financing. By
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1960 the populist phase of the revolution was over and the
groundwork was laid for the national corporate phase which was
to follow.
This new mode of political economy was broadened and more
clearly defined after 1960 within the context of the Alliance for
Progress strategy accepted by the MNR. Particularly under the
Triangular Plan 2 for the rehabilitation of the tin industry, labor
was kept on the defensive and the MNR instituted a concerted
effort to break its political power once and for all. Through the
"civic action" logic central to the Alliance, President Paz
Estenssoro sought to solidify the military-peasant alliance and
with U.S. help turned the military into the key group in the
situation. 3 During this period the organized private sector of the
economy made a startling comeback, the position of COMIBOL
stabilized and Bolivia began to register growth rates of over 5
percent per year. Despite these apparent economic successes,
internal divisions in the MNR and social protest brought on by
President Paz's policies so weakened the credibility of the MNR
that it was a surprisingly simple task for the military to topple the
government in November 1964.4

The Generals and the Revolution:
The Consolidation of National Corporatism

From November 1964 to August 1966, Bolivia was governed by a
military cabinet with first General Rene Barrientos alone, and later
(in May) he and General Alfredo Ovando together acting as chief
executive. In 1966 Barrientos waged a successful electoral
campaign and in August was inaugurated as constitutional
president. Ovando assumed the position of commander-in-chief of
the armed forces. Throughout this period both stressed that their
administration did not constitute a counterrevolution but a true
realization of the national populist revolution originally promised
by th~ MNR but betrayed by capricious men such as Paz.
The new government immediately looked to the United States
as a major source of aid and, after a brief period of indecision, the
United States supported the generals. Indeed many in the
American Embassy argued that only the military had the will and
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capacity to maintain stability, promote enterprise and achieve
planned rates of economic growth.
The coup of 1964. changed little from the point of view of
political economy. The new regime followed, bUt more effectively,
the same game plall formulated by Paz and his U.S. advisers in the
previous four years (Thorn, 1971: 199). Under Barrientos and
Ovando, Bolivia moved definitively and rather ruthlessly in the
national corporatist direction. Under the new law for the
promotion of investment passed in October 1965, private
investment rose from $3 million in 1963-64 to $47 million in
1966. Gulf Oil investments increased from an annual average of
$6,991,706 (1957-63) to an average of $16,742,475 (1965-68).
New mining laws also spurred private investment and parts of the
state's mining activities were denationalized. 5 The Matilde zinc
mine, for example, was sold to a U.S. combine of U.S. Steel and
the Philips brothers. In addition, private contract mining was
reintroduced into the state mining operation and many laid-off
miners were obliged to work for these contractors without the
labor code's protection. The resurgence of the private sector in
mining and petroleum is evident in Table 1.
Table 1 Private and Public Production of
Crude Oil and Minerals (1963-1968)
CRUDE OIL
(000 cubic meters)
Private
Public
(Gulf)
(Y.P.F.B.)

1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

18.5
15.2
2.3
458.6
1,872.0
1,886.2

501.6
498.0
528.2
504.5
435.1
497.4

MINERALS*
(000 metric tons)
Private
Public
(COMIBOL)

27.0
35.0
35.0
43.0
47.0
48.3t

26.0
28.0
27.0
33.0
32.0
34.5t

*Minerals include tin, lead, zinc, copper, antimony and wolfram.

t USAID estimates.
Source: USAID (1969a).

Private corporate activity once again dominated mining which
accounted for 85 percent of Bolivia's export earnings and
petroleum, the nation's fastest growing industry. While there is no
precise serial data on rates of private tnvestment in other
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industries, Table 2 shows that by 1968 the overall Bolivian
economy was dominated by the private sector. Private corporate
activity had truly made a comeback in the 1960s.
Table 2 Gross Domestic Product and Employment
Broken Down by Private and Public Sector Contributions (1968)
Gross Domestic Prod.*

Agriculture
Mining
Petroleum
Manufacturing & energy
Construction
Commerce & finance
Transportation
Government
Other services
Total

Employmentt

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

Total

Public

Private

Total

Public

1,224
457
435
773
346
619
417
475
500

05
55
20
25
30
05
05
100
20
25

95
45
20
75
70
95
95
00
80
75

897
54
07
104
122
98
58
58
167
1,567

05
45
65
25
30
05
05
100
20
15

Private
95
55
35
75
70
95
95
00
80

5,245

85

*In millions of pesos at 1958 prices.
tIn thousands.
Source: Burke (1970).

Bolivia's public corporations were not neglected by the
Barrientos government. During the years 1965-68, EN DE (the
national electic power company), LAB (the national airlines) and
other Bolivian public corporations received substantial assistance
from both the Bolivian government and foreign lenders. LAB
alone began receiving the first dispersion of an $18 million loan
package in 1968 negotiated by the Barrientos government. The
nationalized railroads obtained credits from Japan totaling $10
million in 1966 for capital equipment. In addition, the third phase
of the Triangular Plan to rehabilitate COMIBOL was agreed upon
in the summer of 1965 after the Bolivian government sent the
army to the mines to "discipline" (destroy) the labor unions and
to "rationalize" (reduce) the labor force. Under this agreement,
COMIBOL received credits totaling $10 million to be expended by
1968. As a result of this economic policy, the major public
corporations of Bolivia in the aggregate began to realize economic
profits for the first time in their history.
When the proposed tin smelter, gas pipeline, fertilizer plant and
other public investments are added to the above, the evidence
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supporting the contention that the Barrientos government pursued
an economic policy of promoting large-scale private and public
corporate units is substantial. The gas pipeline alone necessitated
. an investment of $46 million jointly financed by Gulf Oil
Company and the World Bank. The private and public corporations of Bolivia are similar in more ways than they differ. Both are
autonomous, profit-maximizing and growth-oriented enterprises.
Table 3 Profit and Loss* Positions
of the Major Public Enterprises
($ millions)
Year

COMIBOL

1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1964-68

-4.1
0.3
2.0
1.1

1.2
0.5

Y.P.F.B.

Railroads

Total

1.1

-3.1
-1.3
-1.3
-0.7
-1.3t
-7.8

-6.2
0.4
3.3
4.0
3.9
5.4

1.4
2.6
3.6
4.0
12.7

*Loss (-); profit (+)
tUSAID estimates.
Source: USAID (1969a).

If Bolivia were not an underdeveloped country, none of this
behavior on the part of the Barrientos government would seem
worthy of mention, let alone analysis. However, Bolivia is an
underdeveloped country with a large traditional sector which this
national corporate policy discriminates against. Nowhere is this
more evident than in agriculture.

Traditionalism
In Table 2 agriculture is seen to engage more people in production
than any other sector, yet agriculture was the only major Bolivian
industry that experienced virtually no growth during 1964-68 as
seen in Table 4. In addition, it is estimated that the majority of
the Bolivian labor force engaged in agricultural production
accounted for only 20 percent of the gross domestic output in
1968.
How does one explain this lack of growth in the agricultural
sector when the avowed goal of the Bolivian development plan is
to diversify the economy, to substitute domestic food production
. for imports and to raise the standard of living (Ministerio de
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Planificaci6n, 1962)? Agriculture, unlike mining, aviation and the
other sectors, is dominated by nonmodern units of production
best described as traditional peasant farms. Largely because of
this, agricultural production was assigned a low priority by the
Barrientos government. In addition, it was the modern corporate
segment of agriculture which received the bulk of the technical
assistance and financial support allocated.
Table 4 Index of Gross Domestic Product Increases
by Sector in Constant 1958 Prices (1963 = 100)

Agriculture
Mining
Petroleum
Manufacturing & energy
Construction
Commerce & finance
Transportation
Government services
Other services
Total

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

1.02
1.08
1.06
1.09
1.02
1.04
1.05
l.l4
l.l2

1.05
1.09
2.12
1.20
1.28
1.08
1.09
l.l5
l.l4

1.06
l.l8
1.56
1.32
1.42
l.l1
l.l3
1.26
l.l8

0:99
1.24
2.69
1.40
1.75
l.l4
l.l9
1.28
1.11

1.03
1.27
2.84
1.49
2.01
1.20
1.24
1.32
1.29

100

1.05

l.l1

l.l8

1.24

1.31

Source: Ministerio de Planificaci6n (1969).

Because the latifundia of prerevolutionary Bolivia were inefficient, backward and stagnant, they were expropriated in 1953 and
the land redistributed to the peasants. 6 The governments of
Bolivia have since been faced with a dilemma inasmuch as the new
land tenure system is also predominantly nonmodern in structure.
This may explain why the Bolivian governments have not yet
legally entitled all the land obtained by the peasants under the
agrarian reform law. Only about 25 percent of the agricultural
land censused in 1950 was redistributed to the peasants by 1968.
In addition, the Barrientos government during 1964-68 granted an
annual average of 16,119 titles as compared with an annual
average of 40,095 titles issued during the previous five years
(Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria, Departamento de Estadisticas). One explanation for the small amount of land titled since
1953 is the fact that the large estates in the lowlands were not
affected by the reform. These lowland estates now constitute the
new corporate sector of Bolivian agriculture.
As can be seen in Table 5 below, Bolivia spends the same
amount of foreign exchange on food and related agricultural
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imports today as it did before the agrarian reform of 1953. In
1967, $22.4 million of milk, wheat flour and edible oil were
imported, all of which could have been produced in Bolivia.
Table 5 Value of Imports by Type
($ millions)

Year

Food, Beverages,
Tobacco & Live
Animals

Raw
Materials

Mfg.
Capital
Goods

Other
Mfg.
Goods

1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1967

27.8
23.1
2l.5
15.5
13.9
20.5
18.3
25.7
30.9

10.8
9.8
7.2
4.7
5.9
15.1
15.5
24.8
26.2

15.5
1l.8
27.2
24.6
26.6
30.0
3l.2
49.2
54.0

38.5
20.8
28.1
34.8
25.1
31.3
37.7
38.7
39.9

Principal Imports
Milk
Wheat flour
Greases and edible oils
Machinery
Vehicles
Iron and steel
Source:

1960
1.5
6.1

15.0
5.7

1965
2.4
12.2
5.4
21.5
16.0
14.8

1967
2.8
14.1
5.5
31.7
2l.6
12.1

USAID (1969a).

That Bolivia can efficiently and economically produce her own
wheat, edible oil, milk and other foods is no longer seriously
questioned. Why then does she not allocate the necessary
investment funds to the task? For example, it is estimated that the
Barrientos government annually allotted only 3 percent of its
budget to agriculture. In addition, nearly all of these investment
funds were received and spent by the corporate agriculture sector
in the lowlands of Santa Cruz and the Beni. Consequently, the
methods of production and level of technology in the highlands
and valleys has remained virtually unchanged since the time of the
Incas. Community development is the largest single project in the
traditional rural sector and its major efforts are directed to
improving health and education. It is therefore not surprising to
find that the production of such traditional crops as potatoes,
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corn and wheat remained stagnant or decreased from 1964 to
1968. 7 On the other hand, the increase in rice, sugar and beef was
due to large public investments supporting private corporate
activity in the lowlands.
Table 6 Indices of Selected Agricultural Products*

(1963 = 100)
Year

Peeled
Rice

Refined
Sugar

Beef

1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

1.25
1.32
1.38
1.37
1.81

1.36
1.25
1.18
1.39
1.58

1.04
1.31
1.51
1.49
1.63t

Potatoes

100
105
107
102
102t

Corn
(Grain)

100
92

93
86
84

Wheat

104
64
75
49
82

*Original data in thousands of metric tons with the exception of beef which is in heads
of cattle slaughtered.
t USAID estimates.
Source: USAID (1969a).

For example, over $100 million has been invested in roads,
colonization and related projects in the lowlands. All of this has
indirectly benefited the corporate farmers in these regions. More
specifically, cattle production in the Beni has made rapid progress
due to past loans from IDA, AID and the government of Bolivia.
In 1968, the Agricultural Bank began negotiating a $ 23 milliop
loan with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank to finance beef cattle production. More recently, the
Cattlemen's Association of the Beni signed a contract with
COMIBOL to supply the entire nationalized mines' beef requirements. Originally these past investments were intended to make
Bolivia self-sufficient in beef. Later, however, the goal was
changed to promote exportation.
A similar situation existed in rice and sugar production. In 1967
and 1968 alone rice farmers received over $1 million in economic
assistance from USAID. These loans, too, were predominantly
made to large commercial producers and millers like Grace, Ransa
and others. The resultant industrial concentration reached the
point where 3 percent of the rice farmers in three Santa Cruz
provinces produced over 30 percent of the area output on farms
averaging better than 100 hectares. Today, Bolivia is self-sufficient
in rice and sugar and no one can deny that the increase in the
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output of these products was the result of these large investments
in agricultural machinery, sugar and rice mills, etc.
Both foreign lenders and the Bolivian government constantly
~ite the production record of these few products as examples of
the tremendous strides being made in agriculture. Nowhere,
however, does one encounter an admission that such impressive
returns were accompanied by a large opportunity cost. What, for
example, would the returns have been had these millions been
invested in the traditional sector of Bolivian agriculture? Perhaps
Bolivia would not now be spending approximately $14 million
annually of her scarce foreign exchange on imported wheat and
flour (an amount, incidentally, vastly greater than the total value
of the entire Bolivian rice and sugar production). It is paradoxical
that the local currency generated from PL480 wheat flour sales
was used to build roads, promote colonization and increase
production of rice, sugar and cattle in the lowlands-that is, do
everything except increase the production of wheat (Burke, 1971).
In short, the peasant agriculturalists were discriminated against in
Bolivia during the 1960s and because of this the agricultural sector
stagnated.
The reluctance and/or inability of the Barrientos government to
deal with the small, competitive, noncorporate producers was also
evident in the retailing service and artisan sectors. In every case the
result was the same: production stagnant, productivity low and
technology backward because little or no investment funds were
made available to these producers.
Stabilization and Growth
Nationally, a very conservative monetary and fiscal policy was
adhered to by the Barrientos government. It is only fair to point
out that AID, IMF and other organizations made fiscal and
monetary restraint conditional to aid. The result of the Bolivian
government's pursuit of stable prices was increased government
budget deficits and an enormous foreign debt.
The major instrument responsible for the restricted credit
expansion and overall spending in the Bolivian economy from
1964 to 1968 was the annual IMF-Bolivian standby agreements. s
The purpose of these agreements was to improve the balance of
payments by restricting credit expansion and spending in the

61

POPULISM TO CCRPORATISM: BOLIVIA

economy-thereby improving public finances while maintaining
reasonable price stability and economic growth. Table 7 reveals
the amount and extent of these agreed upon credit restrictions
from 1965 to 1968.
Table 7 Credit and Spending Limitations of Recent
IMF-Bolivian Standby Agreements ($b. millions)
Subject to Ceilings
Overall monetary system
Central government (GOB)
Public corporations
Counterpart accounts
Private sector

1965

1966

122

161

116

110

1967

1968

109
60

193.6

3
6

125.6

40

40

47.9
59.4

11

6

-39.3

Note: These figures are only approximations since the standby agreements are not
available to the general public. In addition, the time period of the agreements vary. The
1968 agreements lasted, for example, thirteen and one-half months.
Source: Banco Central de Bolivia, Departamento Monetario.

By more or less adhering to these controls, apparent price
stability was achieved. The Bolivian peso remained at 11,885 to
the U.S. dollar, foreign exchange reserves increased from $21.3
million in 1964 to $32.4 million in 1968,9 and inflation was at
least contained as seen in Table 8 below.
As indicated by the data, these nonselective monetary restraints
were no panacea for Bolivia's economic problems. On the
contrary, there is every reason to believe that the tight monetary
policy, at least in part, contributed to these very same problems.
The stable exchange rate, while it has its merits, was almost
considered sacrosanct by the Bolivian authorities. However,
because Bolivia's trading partners continually devalued their
currencies over this time period, it follows that if the Bolivian peso
was optimally related to the currencies of her trading partners in
1959-with the exception of the United States and Germany-it is
highly unlikely that the peso remains today in the same optimum
relationship. 1 0 Not only did the stable fixed exchange rate do
nothing to induce export earnings or retard import expenditures,
it was also ineffective in stimulating foreign investments or
reinvestment of foreign profits earned in Bolivia. Net private
foreign investment decreased by $12.5 million (mainly Gulf Oil
Company investments) in 1965 to an estimated minus $ 2.8 million
in 1968. 1 1 During the same time period, net investment income
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Table 8 Balance of Payments, Central Government Total Budget,
Increases in Foreign Debt, Rate of Inflation
and Rate of Real Economic Growth (1964-1968)

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

-95.0

-228.5

-224.8

-445.7

-477.2

Increases in GOB
foreign debt
($ U.S. millions)

12.1

14.2

7.9t

22.0

37.6

Balance of payments*
($ U.S. millions)

17.6

14.2

3.2

-9.0

0.6

Rate of inflation
(La Paz)

10.2

2.9

6.9

11.2

5.5

Rate of growth
(GDP in constant prices)

4.8

5.6

6.5

7.2

4.7

Per capita GSP in
constant prices

2.4

3.4

3.9

3.1

4.9

GOB budget*
($b. millions)

*Deficit (-); surplus (+)
t$9 million in interest to Eximbank forgiven.
Source: USAID (1969a).

leaving the country increased from $1 million to $10.5 million.
U.S. grants to Bolivia also decreased from $18.4 million in 1964 to
$3.5 million in 1968. 12 The only thing which saved Bolivia from
experiencing a complete disaster in her international accounts in
1967 and 1968 was the compensating increase in foreign loans to
the central government and her public corporations from $14.2
million in 1964 to $52.0 million in 1968.
Ultimately, these tremendous increases in central government
capital expenditures to compensate for the decreased foreign
investment expenditures and U.S. grants resulted in large budget
deficits and tremendous increases in the nation's foreign debt.1 3
Although private domestic investments increased during
1964-68, these too were severely handicapped by the credit
restrictions inasmuch as they were instrumental in exhausting the
excess reserves of the private banking system. 14
Fortunately, increased savings were forthcoming to finance
much of the new domestic investment spending. Bank demand
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deposits grew from $b. 142.4 million in 1964 to $b. 282.9 in
1968, bank savings deposits from $b. 98.2 to $b. 264.8, and the
portion of total loans to the private sector from 26 percent in
1963 to 50 percent in 1968 (USAID, 1969a).
In summary, the tight money policy of the Barrientos
government can hardly be considered an unequivocal success.
True, price stability was obtained which in turn encouraged an
increase in domestic savings and investment during 1964-68.
However, the tight credit restrictions prevented domestic investments (both private and public) from increasing in sufficient
quantity to offset the decrease in U.S. grants and foreign
investment. In addition, virtually the entire flow of investments
from all sources was allocated to large public and private
corporations or to social overhead capital projects like roads.
Stable prices, while serving the Bolivian corporate interests in the
short run, may well have been self-defeating inasmuch as the
nation's budget remained unbalanced, the foreign debt increased
and the people's aspirations for a higher standard of living were
scarcely satisfied.
Table 9 Reserves of the Private Banking System
($b. millions)

1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

Total
Reserves

Legal
Reserves

60.5
97.9
104.6
116.8
120.6

48.4
63.0
84.2
96.9
122.0

Excess
Reserves
12.1
24.9
20.4
19.9
-1.4

Source: Superintendencia de Bancos, Boletines Mensuales.

These last statements are thinly veiled implications that the
Barrientos government sacrificed growth for price stability. There
is no way of knowing what would have been the effect upon
prices, output, etc., had the government seen fit to pursue some
alternative policy. Although Bolivia's real growth rate over these
years is rather impressive, especially when contrasted with those of
previous years, one cannot but suspect that a much greater
increase in real output could have been obtained at very little cost.
For example, a greater expansion of credit would undoubtedly
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have resulted in increased domestic private investment in light of
the great demand for loanable funds. That such an expansion of
domestic credit would inevitably contribute to inflation is
doubtful. 15 Likewise, a policy of allocating a small amount of
investment funds to the noncorporate sector of the economy in
quick payoff projects such as flour import substitution (instead of
high-cost, long-term payoff infrastructure projects) would have
reaped very large and immediate benefits for the Bolivian
economy. It is impossible to imagine Bolivia attaining anything
approximating self-sustaining growth unless the traditional sector
is integrated into the country's market economy.
Nationalism
There are various other ways in which national corporatism
manifested itself throughout the years of the Barrientos administration. Institutions and activities which create, expand or
strengthen nationalism prospered from 1964 to 1968. Foremost
among these institutions was public education. Approximately 33
percent of the central government's budget appropriations in 1968
went to education; half of the school population received Food
for Peace assistance; and a bewildering number of education and
human resource stUdies have been made. 1 6 The World Bank, lOB,
UNESCO, UNICEF and similar organizations had numerous
projects in operation and expressed a willingness to invest even
more in the area.
All this is eminently logical since public education is an
indispensable building block of nationalism. Education as a
mechanism of national integration is a particularly crucial question
in a racially diverse country such as Bolivia where over 60 percent
of the population is both racially and culturally Indian. One could
argue that the effort in public education, whatever its presumed
benefit for the Indian masses, was also an attempt by the
dominant mestizo and white groups to control the Indian majority
by "integrating" them into the extant creole culture. Education is
also a field considered to lie within the public domain by the
United States and other western donors, which qualifies it for
massive aid. These huge expenditures of funds and effort could
not, however, raise the Bolivian literacy rate above an estimated
60 percent of the population by 1968. This is more indicative of
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the magnitude of the problem than the lack of commitment on
the part of the government and others. Education is one of the
few noncorporate institutions that can look forward to continued
support from the national corporate establishment of Bolivia.
Road construction was another activity vigorously promoted by
the Barrientos government. The central government's highway
expenditures, exclusive of foreign grants and loans, averaged
approximately $ 5 million annually from 1964 to 1968. Roads,
like education, are generally considered to lie within the public
domain and received more foreign assistance than any other
project. USAID alone invested over $75 million in roads since
1961 and presently has approximately $ 68 million in the road
construction pipeline.! 7 Typically, road construction is justified
on the grounds that it promotes colonization and ultimately
increases agricultural production. The poor performance of the
entire agricultural sector, however, belies the elaborate and
expensive cost-benefit studies which attempt to economically
justify road projects. Roads are favored over other projects
because of the attempt to integrate the culturally diverse and
geographically dispersed segments of Bolivian society and thus
serve the national corporate state. Again, the modest gains in this
field, as measured by the 15,500 miles of roads in all of Bolivia,
indicate no lack of commitment on the part of the national
corporate governments. However, there exists abundant evidence
of the unplanned, inefficient and unproductive nature of Bolivia's
transportation development.! 8
Finally, no respectable national corporate structure would be
complete without a strong military. The Barrientos government
increased its expenditures on military outlays from $ b. 71.7
million in 1964 to $ b. 160.9 million in 1968, or by more than 100
percent. This was the largest percentage increase in central
government expenditures on current account over this time period
(lMF, 1967-68). The obvious reason Bolivia maintains approximately 20,000 men in the armed forces is to police the nation,
i.e., "maintain law and order." The absence of armor, combat
aircraft, etc., belies any claim to protecting national sovereignty.
The multimillion dollar military assistance supplied by the United
States is, in effect, counterrevolutionary political assistance. In
AID jargon, part of this support is designated "public safety"
assistance. Politics and the military in Bolivia are inextricably
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intertwined, and therefore the military, like education and road
construction, can look forward to continued support and close
association with the national corporate state.
From an economic point of view, these vast expenditures on
education, roads and the military at this stage of Bolivia's
development can hardly be justified. Aside from the military
expenditures which need little explanation, the other two are
high-cost, long-term investments in infrastructure of questionable
payoff. They are major contributors to the current government
budget deficits, balance of payments deficits and foreign debt.
They appear to be classic examples of the type of misallocation of
resources one encounters in this type of system.
The Social Effects of the Policy
Whatever the long-range economic merits of the Barrientos
program, it was in the short run a period of prosperity for some.
The healthy private sector gave birth to an incipient new upper
class of entrepreneurs, speculators and high level managers. The
urban middle class benefited from the expansion of middle-level
public and private jobs, rising salaries and a stable currency. As the
data above indicated, the single largest institution to benefit was
the Bolivian military. Aside from the limited hard data available,
the new prosperity of the middle and incipient upper classes was
more than obvious in the proliferation of high rise apartments,
posh restaurants, boutiques, fashionable clothing, night clubs, etc.
(see date on construction boom in Table 4).
The cost of this new prosperity was borne mainly by the
popular masses, i.e., workers, urban marginals and peasants; the
hardest hit were workers and in particular miners. Although labor
supported the overthrow of Paz, it was soon to learn that the
thrust against its position went deeper than the policy preference
of a single individual. In the spring of 1965, the Barrientos
government issued a series of labor decrees aimed at bringing the
unions under control. In the mines there were massive layoffs,
salaries were cut in half (from roughly $1.60 a day to $0.80 a day)
and there were reductions in subsidized store privileges. 1 9 When
the miners reacted (May 1965), the military invaded the mines,
smashed the strike and disarmed the militias. When the remainder
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of organized labor protested, the military moved against the entire
movement killing or exiling leaders and submitted what was left of
the once powerful unions to strict governmental control. In
September 1965 and June 1967 the military again entered the
mines by force and put the major mines under permanent
occupation. With the possible exception of oil workers, Bolivian
laborers experienced a relative decline in living standards during
the Barrientos period, primarily because they were forced to live
on fixed or reduced wages in an economy that was running an
inflation of approximately 6 percent a year. Although some new
jobs were created, especially in construction, they were more than
offset by rural-urban migration which held down wages, reduced
employment security and dramatically increased the urban
marginal population of the unemployed and underemployed.
From a political point of view the Indian peasantry, in terms of
publicity at least, was the most courted group in the nation.
Utilizing a helicopter, Barrientos traveled widely in the countryside donning a poncho here, mounting a mule there, and
embracing peasants everywhere.
On each stop he demonstrated his largess by dedicating a
school, promising potable water or distributing soccer balls and
uniforms to the children. He became the patron of all the
peasants-a personalized symbol of he from whom all good things
would personally flow. Throughout the countryside, towns and
villages vied for his personal attention by naming everything from
the town hall to the local bridge after him.
Whatever went into the countryside was localized and personalistic. The operative logic appeared to be that wherever the
peasants were politically sophisticated and their leaders loyal, they
gained; where they were politically marginal or their support in
question, they were either ignored or punished. In certain regions
the unions were squashed and old landowners and townsmen made
a political comeback (Research Institute ... , 1969: 180-206).
The apparent universal peasant support of Barrientos was in fact
pockets of peasant support with rewards doled out accordingly. A
good deal of the money spent in the countryside went to buy
peasant leaders. As the data above indicated, the Indian peasantry
as a whole gained little, and relative to other groups actually lost.
Barrientos courted the peasants through the classic demagogic
means of highly visible activity with large political payoffs but
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with little substantial material benefit in terms of growth or
increased living standards.
To most outside observers, especially those hospitable to his
policies, the Barrientos regime was considered a resounding success
story. In this paper we have tried to show that from the points of
view of long-range economic growth and social justice, that
judgment is dubious. From the point of view of building viable
civil and political institutions his tenure was also mixed. From the
beginning, the regime suffered from two critical structural
weaknesses: (1) it had no political organizational base; and (2) it
excluded the major political organizations of the country. Aside
from the few pockets of peasant support, Barrientos relied
primarily on the military to keep him in power.
As civilian opposition to his regime mounted in 1968-69 (led by
the excluded parties, labor and students), Barrientos's standing
with the military decreased sharply. Although a couple of
attempted coups failed, the signs increasingly pointed to a military
takeover. Before the drama could be played out, however,
Barrientos was killed on April 27, 1969 when his helicopter
crashed after a trip to a peasant village.
After a brief and confused civil interregnum the military
emerged again in September 1970 to assume open control of the
government. From September 1970 to August 1971, Bolivia, first
under General Alfredo Ovando and then General Jose Torres,
appeared to move sharply away from national corporatism. In
August 1971, however, the military backed by the MNR and its
old enemy the Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB) threw Torres out
and announced an end to his "leftist madness." Now marching in
tandem the military and the MNR are putting Bolivia firmly back
on the national corporate track.
Conclusion
The national corporatist style of political economy that emerged
in Bolivia during the 1960s is a logical outcome of the national
populist approach to problems of development. A number of
factors operate to lead to this outcome. One is the clash between
the imperatives of the elite's developmental aims (investment) and
the demands of the supporters of the movement (consumption) in
an environment of scarcity. This clash is exacerbated by the
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multi class nature of the national populist movement and the
inevitable conflict of interests among its supporters once such a
movement achieves formal power. The result is the thorny
problem of how to allocate rewards and more importantly, costs,
within any developmental strategy. In confronting this problem
two factors become crucial: the fundamental orientation of the
national populist elite and the realities of the international
situation. The orientation of these elites is fundamentally
middle-class, elitist and reformist. This orientation becomes
critical when the elite seeks to decide how to relate' to
international actors.
While populism is rhetorically nationalistic and antiimperialistic,
the elites of these movements, in this case the MNR, have rejected
the eastern socialist bloc as a major source of aid and therefore, in
the long run, were forced to remain dependent on western
capitalist powers for needed external financing. As we have seen,
aid through instrumentalities such as the IMF, etc., carries strings
which limit options on how to deal with social costs and therefore
has profound political repercussions. Thus the middle-class
orientation of the populist elite and the realities of external
financing combine to create a reality wherein the situation of
dependence is modified but by no means eliminated. The popUlist
approach is heavily statist (thereby swelling the number of
bureaucratic positions) but in no way socialist. Populism attacks
the so-called feudal past and dependence in the name of a new
form of dependence and a technocratic form of state capitalism
which we call national corporatism.
The concept of national corporatism is still crude and needs
refinement. Our tentative view of how the ideal-typical national
corporatist system operates is as follows. Control in the system is
in the hands of a complex new elite of economic and political
entrepreneurs, technocrats, bureaucrats and often top labor leaders. In Bolivia, labor was excluded because: (a) the unions
controlled important industries, e.g., mining, which had to be
"reformed"; and (b) the unions were led by leaders who rejected
the corporate model. In other countries, e.g., Mexico, highly
organized unions led by "cooperative" leaders have often obtained
"a piece of the action," thereby dividing the labor movement into
favored and unfavored segments. The power of the new elites rests
on an alliance of powerful corporate interests in the public and
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private sectors coordinated by an agglomerated party or, as has
recently been the case in Peru and Bolivia, by a nationalist
oriented military. Through such coordination, the state or public
sector seeks to "regulate" the private sector so that its activities
redound to national economic growth. The distribution of jobs
and income is accomplished through bargaining in a nationally
regulated market with those highly organized groups capable of
deploying political or economic power holding the upper hand.
Hence, the bulk of the costs tends to fall on noncorporate
interests such as peasants, urban marginals and the less wellorganized workers. These allocations are often backed by force in
cases of protest-for example, the Bolivian army's occupation of
the mines in 1965 and 1967. National corporatism as an economic
philosophy differs from the more orthodox philosophies of socialism or capitalism. National corporatism as the name implies, favors
nationally owned enterprises and is at least rhetorically antiimperialistic. While national corporate governments are willing to
nationalize foreign holdings, such actions are not based on a
philosophy that favors public over private property. These nationalizations are always presented as specific actions against specific
companies for their specific antinational sins. While some foreign
holdings are taken over and often certain sectors put off limits to
outsiders, foreign investment as such is not rejected but in fact
encouraged. National corporate governments attempt to control
such investment and seek better terms for the country, but often
their abi!ity to bargain IS cons~r~in~d by international ~conomi.G.
realities.
With respect to productive property, national corporatism is
indifferent as to public or private domestic ownership. However,
because few governmental officials themselves are indifferent to
the issue of public versus private ownership, they tend, at any
given time, to favor one or the other. The long-run result of this
continual oscillation is compromise, i.e., a mixed economy. Lastly,
national corporatism promotes corporations over other forms of
business enterprise. Autonomous corporations, both public and
private, are viewed as dynamic, efficient, modern institutions
which will ensure the economic development of the nation and a
higher standard of living for its people. Small peasant farms,
cooperatives, artisans, and other non corporate producers are tolerated, but never enthusiastically supported.
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It is our hope that this exploration in the development of
national corporatism in Bolivia will aid in the understanding of the
changes taking place in other Latin American nations, particularly
those where national popular movements have achieved some
measure of power. Moreover, we hope it gives a base for
anticipating the emergence of general lines of political economy in
other nations which choose the national popular approach.
Specifically we have in mind Peru which is presently engaged in an
experiment in military populism. Our anticipation is that when all
is said and done military populism in Peru will result in a system
that is a variation on the theme of national corporatism.

NOTES
L The following statement of the MNR leader Victor paz Estenssoro (1955: 316-17) is
a good example: "It is a general law that the men of the oppressed class are never the
ones who achieve gains for their own class, and this for a simple reason: those of the
oppressed class do not have the economic means to even raise themselves culturally and
develop their personality, let alone be able to make a great reform or a revolution ... "
2. The Plan involved a pledge of $37 million to refurbish COMIBOL by the U.S.
government, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Inter-American Development
Bank. In return Bolivia was to "rationalize" its labor policies primarily by submitting
unions to managerial discipline, holding the line on wages and laying off excess workers.
The plan was to cause a major confrontation between the MNR and labor.
3. U.S. military aid to Bolivia was resumed in 1958 and climbed from $0.1 million in
1958 to $3.2 million in 1964. During this period the military regained its traditional
control function and assumed important developmental tasks as well. As relations
between the MNR and labor deteriorated the military moved into the pivot of the
political situation. For data on military and economic aid see Blasier (1971: 77).
4. For a more detailed analysis of the 1952-64 period see Malloy (1970) and Malloy
and Thorn (1971).
5. These include Supreme Decrees Nos. 7148, 7447 and 7360 of 1965.
6. A Bolivian highland latifundium was a large agricultural operation which utilized
great quantities of land and labor combined with little capital other than breeding
livestock. They were usually absentee-owned and run on traditional rather than
profit-maximizing principles.
7. Many observers become confused when they consider the multitUde of projects in
the traditional sector of Bolivian agriculture with their meager results. But the Peace
Corps, community development and the like are no substitutes for massive investments
in production.
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8. These standby agreements are arrangements between the IMF and individual
countries whereby the Fund furnishes the country with international reserves (gold,
dollars, etc.) in excess of its "drawing rights" provided it undertakes certain corrective
measures to balance its international accounts. A country has drawing rights to 25
percent of its IMF quota; Bolivia's IMF quota is $25 million; therefore, she has drawing
rights to $7.25 million. Bolivia has entered into eleven standby agreements with the
Fund, the last one for $20 million became effective January 16,1969, which will run for
approximately one year.
9. However, $12.4 million of these 1968 total reserves were IMF reserves as opposed to
$5.5 million of the 1965 total reserves (USAID, 1969b).
10. Only the U.S. dollar remained in a fixed relationship with the Bolivian peso. Great
Britain devalued her currency by 15 percent since 1964. Argentina by 167 percent,
Brazil by 213 percent, Chile by 129 percent and Peru by 60 percent.
11. The minus figure is explained by depreciation charges exceeding investment
expenditures.
12. The decrease in grants was a unilateral decision on the part of the United States.
Bolivia could only accept it.
13. U.S. grants to the central government decreased from $b. 93.5 million in 1964 to
$b. 10.6 million in 1968, while central government capital expenditures increased from
$b. 160.5 million in 1964 to $b. 473.9 million in 1968. The central government's total
budget deficit in 1964 was $b. 95 million and in 1968 it was an estimated $b. 477.2
million (IMF, 1967-68).
14. This unusual situation of the existence of temporary negative excess reserves was the
result of SD No. 08576 of November 16, 1968, which raised the legal reserve
requirement on demand deposits from 35 percent to 40 percent and on savings deposits
from 25 percent to 30 percent. Shortly thereafter, however, the banks were able to
adjust.
15. The only statistics on inflation in the La Paz price index (in addition to being
somewhat unreliable) only represent about 10 percent of the Bolivian population and
not a representative 10 percent at that. Further, these credit restrictions themselves have
contributed to higher interest charges and higher procurement prices for the government,
which because of the central bank credit ceiling imposed upon it by the IMF Bolivian
standby agreements was forced to buy with nonnegotiable IOUs at higher prices.
16. To name just a few, there is the Ohio State University Resource Survey, a School
Building Survey and a Vocational Education Survey all financed by USAID/La Paz.
17. The fact that virtually all road construction was undertaken by U.S. contractors
undoubtedly made it a politically acceptable AID venture.
18. The UN/IBRD Global Transportation Study exposes a greater deal of the
unplanned, inefficient and politically oriented Bolivian road program. This perhaps
explains why the Bolivian government has not yet seen fit to release the study to the
general public.
19. The labor force in COMIBOL mines was decreased from 25,225 workers in 1964 to
20,917 in 1968.
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